Israel has two objectives in Gaza, and they haven't changed since 10/7. One is the destruction of Hamas. The other is the return of all the remaining hostages. Thus far, Israel has largely achieved its first objective. Hamas is losing the war. However, despite significant achievements on the battlefield, Israel has failed to achieve its second objective.
Israel's leaders understand that it may be impossible to secure the release of the hostages without some kind of compromise. Hamas's remaining leaders understand that, within the current dynamic, the group has little hope for survival. Amidst the frantic US efforts to secure a ceasefire, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has issued demands for a deal that would keep him alive, regardless of the other terms.
With a regional war looming and time running out for the hostages, the Israeli government and the Biden Administration might consider taking a page out of President Ronald Reagan's playbook. Indeed, lessons can be gleaned from the 1982 ouster of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces from Beirut.
The parallels between the First Lebanon War and the current Gaza war are several. The Lebanon War in 1982 was triggered by high-profile PLO terrorist attacks out of Lebanon, much like the current war was triggered by the October 7 attack out of Gaza. Israeli forces invaded Lebanon with the stated goals of securing Israel's border and defeating the terror group that had provoked a war. The same can be said about Israel's goals in Gaza. Similar to what we have seen in Gaza, the Lebanon War resulted in significant casualties, as well as mass displacement of civilians. This contributed to a shift in public perception against Israel, which put pressure on the Jewish state to embrace alternatives to conflict. Today, Israel faces remarkably similar pressure.
Here's what happened back in 1982: Amid international calls for a ceasefire, a deal was brokered under the direction of the Reagan administration. It allowed PLO forces, including chairman Yasser Arafat, and approximately 14,000 fighters, to leave Lebanon for Tunisia. While Israel did not totally eradicate the PLO, this compromise removed the PLO from Lebanon, secured the border, and ended the war.
The current dynamic presents a similar window for strategic compromise. If Israel continues to pursue the complete destruction of Hamas, it would be justified. However, the intense public pressure both from inside and outside Israel is likely going to continue, and the lives of the remaining hostages will continue to hang in the balance. The way out is a deal that would allow for the exile of the vestiges of Hamas to a distant country. Turkey, Algeria, and Malaysia are three countries that are likely amenable to hosting the group.
Since February, Israel has suggested a willingness to entertain such a compromise. And while there are undoubtedly downsides, such an arrangement might yield Israel the best shot at achieving its two war aims.
Exile of Hamas from Gaza will appeal to a wide range of actors involved in this conflict. For Israel, it would not only enable a deal that would return the hostages. It would allow for an end to the war in Gaza, which has taken a financial and societal toll on Israel after nearly eleven months of fighting. Ending the war would also allow the Israelis to begin to rebuild the country's public image after a withering public relations war mounted by Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other malign actors.
For the United States, this would also have great benefits. Ahead of the 2024 election, there is significant pressure on Vice President Kamala Harris and the Biden Administration to end the hostilities in Gaza. A Reagan-style deal could minimize (though certainly not eliminate) the risk of a wider war with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its many foreign fighting forces. Indeed, the regime and its proxies have indicated a tentative willingness to stop their war if there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Economically, there is also a clear virtue to this approach. The Pentagon has dispatched significant military assets to the region on several occasions. And the cost of doing so is not small. Importantly, there are also eight American hostages that our government has an obligation to return home.
Finally, a deal would also be in the interest of Palestinians in Gaza, who are desperate for a ceasefire. After eleven months, the Gazans would finally have the opportunity to rebuild—and under a deradicalized government. The Sunni Arab world would also welcome this, and some of the Gulf states may be inclined to support Gaza's reconstruction once Hamas is officially in exile.
Admittedly, a deal does not come without drawbacks. Hamas would continue to exist. The group would likely work overtime from abroad to stoke unrest in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and beyond. In other words, Israel's fight against Hamas would continue. But this will likely be the case regardless.
There is also the risk of normalizing Hamas. That turned out to be the fatal flaw in the Reagan plan. In 1982, the PLO was widely viewed as a villainous organization. But after only nine years of exile in Tunisia, Arafat returned to Gaza in 1993 in triumph as part of the Oslo Accords. His PLO was made the backbone of the newly created Palestinian Authority. Despite his efforts to convince the world that he and his organization had turned a new leaf, the old terrorist returned to violence with the Second Intifada of 2000.
Israel and the United States should make it clear that Hamas will never have a future in Palestinian politics. Other countries should be called upon to support this, as well.
Finally, there is the question of Yahya Sinwar himself. Israel will almost certainly refuse to offer the architect of the October 7 attacks a lifeline. Sinwar may be able to negotiate a life sentence in an Israeli jail. While the Hamas leader may not love this idea, it's a better alternative to the certain death that currently awaits him should he continue to try and fight Israel from within the tunnels of Gaza.
The Biden Administration's repeated ceasefire initiatives have tanked, primarily because they lack creativity. Each failed proposal has closely resembled the previous ones. Taking a page out of the Gipper's foreign policy playbook could be a chance to break that cycle.